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Abstract 
When people feel prejudice toward a group, they can justify their prejudice by perceiving the 
group as threatening. Three experiments tested the hypothesis that prejudice causes threat 
perception, using affective conditioning to create new prejudice toward unfamiliar groups. The 
experimentally created prejudice increased threat perception (Expts. 1-3), except when threat 
information was inconsistent with conditioned affect (Expt. 3). Consistency of affect and threat 
information is necessary in order for threat to be a plausible justification of prejudice. Mere 
prejudice can cause perception of threat in the absence of information about the group; this 
finding suggests threats are not necessarily inherent to the characteristics of the group. Threat 
perception can be used as a way to explain the experience of prejudice, rather than forming the 
source of the prejudice itself. 
 
Keywords: threat, prejudice, justification-suppression model 
THREAT AS JUSTIFICATION   3 
Threat as Justification of Prejudice 
Articulate reasons are cogent for us only when our inarticulate feelings of reality have already 
been impressed in favor of the same conclusion. 
—William James (1902, p. 74) 
When George Zimmerman saw a young black man wearing a hoodie walking down the 
street at night in Sanford, Florida, he quickly assumed that Trayvon Martin was dangerous and 
up to no good. This snap judgment led to a confrontation which ended in Zimmerman fatally 
shooting Martin, who was unarmed. One way of looking at these events is to suggest that 
because Black people are believed to be threatening, activation of the threat-management system 
(Schaller & Neuberg, 2012) influenced Zimmerman’s decision to confront Martin. Alternatively, 
one might consider Zimmerman’s perception that Martin was threatening as a way of explaining 
the fear he felt in the immediate social situation (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). In reality, both of 
these accounts are likely to be true. Feelings and beliefs about known social groups are 
inextricably linked—threat can cause prejudice and prejudice can cause threat perception. Thus 
to fully capture the complex relationship between prejudice and threat, theories of prejudice must 
acknowledge and experimentally test both causal pathways. 
In this paper, I investigate the possibility that prejudice
1
 can temporally precede and 
causally influence threat perception. This hypothesis is derived from the justification-suppression 
model of prejudice expression (JSM; Crandall & Eshleman, 2003), which states that conflict 
between negative affect and egalitarian beliefs creates psychological tension. Consequently, 
prejudice is often initially suppressed. The tension can be released, however, if there is an 
available justification. Justifications are “explanations for why a prejudice may be acceptable” 
                                                 
1
 I adopt the definition of prejudice from integrated threat theory—“negative affect associated with outgroups” 
(Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 27; see also Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). 
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(Crandall & Eshleman, 2003, p. 425) that allow for the expression of prejudice. Examples of 
justifications are beliefs, values, religion, and stereotypes. While most theory and research on 
justifications have conceptualized them as causes of prejudice, the JSM considers justifications 
to be releasers of prejudice. The current research focuses on threat as a justification of prejudice. 
Why are certain groups perceived to pose certain threats? Perhaps threats emerge as a way to 
understand the experience of prejudice. 
Certainly both feelings and beliefs influence group evaluations. Just as several popular 
theories focus on stereotypes and threats as sources of prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; 
Fiske, Cuddy, Glick & Xu, 2002; Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Stephan & Stephan, 2000), so 
too is there ample evidence showing the affective foundation of evaluative processing (Forgas, 
1995; Park & Judd, 2005). There are several reasons to believe the activation of prejudice can 
precede the activation of associated cognitions. First, the valence, arousal and motivational 
properties of affect each influence social judgments (Forgas, 1995). Also, affect predicts 
intergroup attitudes better than cognitive factors (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993). Nevertheless, 
prominent theories focus on threats as causes of prejudice. By contrast, a JSM perspective 
considers that threats might emerge after the activation of prejudice, as a way to explain the 
experience of prejudice. 
Theories of Prejudice and Threat 
Intergroup threat theory. Intergroup threat theory (ITT) provides a useful framework 
for understanding the relationship between prejudice and threat. The original model, called 
integrated threat theory (Stephan & Stephan, 2000), identified four types of threat as causes of 
prejudice—realistic and symbolic threat, intergroup anxiety, and negative stereotypes. Newer 
versions of the theory (Stephan & Renfro, 2002; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009) include 
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only realistic and symbolic threats. Realistic threats harm the group’s power, resources, or 
general welfare. Symbolic threats undermine the group’s religion, values, belief system, 
morality, or worldview. 
ITT conceptualizes threats as causes of prejudice; “the core of the model is…the idea that 
threat causes prejudice” (Stephan & Stephan, 2000, p. 37). The theory discusses various 
antecedents (e.g., history of intergroup relations, cultural values, situational factors, or 
characteristics of the groups) and consequences of threat (e.g., cognitive, emotional, and 
behavioral responses), but conceptualizes prejudice only as a consequence of threat. Importantly, 
the idea that prejudice can cause threat has not been emphasized in any version of the theory. 
Many empirical studies cited in support of ITT provide only correlational evidence. For 
example, Stephan, Ybarra, and Bachman (1999) found that threats were associated with 
prejudice toward immigrant groups. These findings have been interpreted as supportive of ITT’s 
basic causal assumption that threat causes prejudice. But, as is always true with correlational data 
of this sort, the data are wholly consistent with the reverse causal model—that prejudice causes 
threat. Experiments are needed to draw conclusions about either causal direction. 
There is some experimental evidence supportive of ITT (e.g., Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, 
& Chow, 2009; Morrison & Ybarra, 2008, 2009; Stephan, Renfro, Esses, Stephan, & Martin, 
2005). Yet the intergroup threat theorists themselves acknowledge that “although these studies 
clearly support the basic causal assumption of the theory (threats lead to prejudice), they do not 
preclude the possibility that the opposite causal pathway exists” (Stephan & Renfro, 2002, p. 
196). The experiments in this paper test this “opposite” causal pathway. 
The Sociofunctional Approach. Like ITT, Cottrell and Neuberg’s sociofunctional 
threat-based approach to prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) 
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hypothesizes that threats are causes of prejudices. They write that, “from qualitatively different 
threats should emerge qualitatively different, and functionally relevant, emotions” (Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005, p. 770). The central prediction is that specific threats cause specific prejudices; 
which threats are perceived from any target group depends upon the functional relationship 
between the target and perceiver’s groups. One implication of this is, given a stable functional 
relationship between the target and perceiver’s groups, there will be a consistent threat profile for 
each target group. The threats perceived from a target group are meaningfully tied to the 
intergroup context and to the specific emotions they evoke. 
The sociofunctional approach relies almost exclusively on correlational data for its 
empirical support (cf. Wilbur, Shapiro, & Neuberg, 2005). Specific groups are shown to be 
associated with specific threats and emotions (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Cottrell, Richards, & 
Nichols, 2010). But these data only demonstrate that specific threats are correlationally linked to 
specific emotions. Threats to safety can certainly cause fear—but if a fear already exists, could 
not a belief that the group is dangerous follow close behind? 
Justification-Suppression Model. In contrast to ITT and the sociofunctional approach, 
the JSM (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) conceptualizes threat perception as a dynamic process. 
Justifications are relatively narrow in scope, often constructed with a particular prejudice in 
mind. Rather than being tied to the inherent qualities of the group or to the nature of the 
intergroup relationship between target and perceiver, threats can be tailored to meet the needs of 
the immediate social situation. This suggests that the same group might be perceived to pose 
different threats in different situations. Beliefs that a group is dangerous may be conjured to 
explain why one avoids a certain part of town, while beliefs that the same group is immoral 
would more easily explain one’s support for war being waged against the group.  
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The JSM provides guidance on when a threat may function as justification, noting that “it 
is essential for the establishment of justification that one expect that others would accept the 
threat posed by the to-be-prejudiced against group as an authentic threat” (Crandall & Eshleman, 
2003, p. 431). In other words, to serve as justification a threat must be plausible; baseless or far-
fetched threats are unlikely to satisfy either a private or a public audience as explanations for 
why the prejudice is acceptable. The most plausible threat in any given situation likely depends 
on the information available about the group and the perceiver’s goals, such as the need to justify 
a particular discriminatory behavior. 
Stereotypes and Threat as Justification of Prejudice 
Theories of prejudice have long theorized about the justification function of stereotypes 
(Allport, 1954; Katz & Braly, 1933; Lippman, 1922), but until recently there was surprisingly 
little direct evidence that stereotypes could emerge as justifications of mere prejudice—affective 
associations uncontaminated by prior stereotypes, threats, or knowledge about the groups 
(compare Crandall, Bahns, Warner, & Schaller, 2011 to Rutland & Brown, 2001). Several 
studies have shown that stereotypes can form to rationalize an attitude or a social role (Eagly & 
Mladinic, 1989; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). Recently, Crandall et al. (2011) demonstrated that 
prejudice can cause stereotypes to emerge; groups associated with negative affect were 
stereotyped as less warm but no less competent. 
The experiments presented in this paper offer several contributions that extend the work 
of Crandall et al. (2011). First, they demonstrate that threat perceptions (in addition to 
stereotypes) can be justifications of prejudice. Second, they measure threat with more specificity 
than the broad dimensions of warmth and competence measured by Crandall et al.; this provides 
a more fine-grained test of the hypothesis that specific beliefs about a group can emerge to 
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justify prejudice. Third, and most importantly, these experiments are the first to test the 
plausibility hypothesis outlined by the JSM. 
The plausibility hypothesis says one must expect that others would accept the threat as an 
authentic threat in order for threat to serve a justification function; the experiments presented in 
this paper test this hypothesis in several ways. Experiments 1 and 2 measured multiple kinds of 
threat (with varying degrees of specificity), to explore the idea that some threats may be more 
likely than others to emerge from conditioned prejudice. If some threats emerge in response to 
conditioned prejudice but others do not, this would suggest that only the emergent threats are 
plausible justifications for prejudice in that particular social context. Experiment 3 manipulated 
plausibility directly, by providing diagnostic information about threat that was either consistent 
or inconsistent with conditioned prejudice. Threat should emerge in response to conditioned 
prejudice when threat is plausible (i.e., when threat information and conditioned prejudice are 
consistent) but not when threat is implausible (i.e., when threat information and conditioned 
prejudice are inconsistent). This design helps to pinpoint the justification function of threat, by 
showing that the effect of conditioned prejudice on threat is eliminated when the plausibility of 
threat is undermined. 
The idea that threat may be used to justify prejudice is not new, but until now it had not 
been experimentally tested. LaPiere (1936) identified perceived threats, which he called “type-
rationalizations,” as the primary reasons Californians gave to explain their antipathy toward 
Armenian immigrants. Beliefs that Armenians were “dishonest, lying and deceitful” were used to 
rationalize negative attitudes (pp. 233-234). While LaPiere’s analysis suggests that Armenian 
antipathy predated the development and application of type-rationalizations, these data cannot 
address the causal relationship between prejudice and threat. 
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Several recent studies by Pereira and colleagues have demonstrated that prejudice can 
predict threat. Pereira, Vala, and Leyens (2009) manipulated infrahumanization of a disliked 
group and found that increased discrimination against the group was mediated by symbolic threat 
perception. Additionally, Pereira, Vala, and Costa-Lopes (2010) found that prejudice was 
associated with increased threat perception, which in turn was associated with increased 
discrimination against immigrants. The researchers have interpreted these findings to mean that 
threat serves to justify discrimination. 
The current research builds upon the work of Pereira and colleagues in two important 
ways. First, experimental methods are used to test the hypothesis that prejudices causes threat, 
whereas the studies by Pereira et al. (2010) are correlational. Second, threat is conceptualized as 
justification of prejudice rather than as justification of discrimination. Prejudice may cause threat 
perception for several different reasons. One possibility is that prejudice causes threat because 
threat justifies having the prejudice (i.e., it explains why the group is “bad”). Another possibility 
is that prejudice causes threat because threat justifies subsequent discrimination (i.e., it provides 
an excuse for “bad” behavior). The current set of experiments provides a test of the former, 
whereas the studies by Pereira et al. (2009, 2010) focus on the latter. 
The correlation that Stephan et al. (1999), Neuberg and Cottrell (2005) and others have 
shown between prejudice and threat may mean prejudice causes threat, threat causes prejudice, 
or even that another variable accounts for their relation. Experimental methods are necessary to 
distinguish between threat’s role as a reason for—or rationalization of—prejudice. 
Overview 
Three experiments tested the hypothesis that prejudice causes threat perception. A 
supraliminal conditioning paradigm adapted from Olson and Fazio (2001) created "new" 
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prejudices toward unfamiliar groups—affective associations that are experimentally introduced 
(see also Crandall et al., 2011).  These methods draw upon evidence that affectively-laden 
attitudes can be created through associative learning processes (Hofmann, DeHouwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010; Krosnick, Betz, Jussim, & Lynn, 1992; Olson & Fazio, 2001). 
While the effects of such a manipulation are likely to be subtle (effect sizes reported by Olson & 
Fazio and Crandall et al. range from .15-.32), the method provides the experimental control 
necessary for testing the causal direction of the relationship between prejudice and threat.  
The goal of the first two experiments was to determine whether threat emerges in 
response to newly created prejudice. Several different stimulus sets and several different 
measures of threat were used to ensure that the effects are not dependent on the content of the 
manipulation or the way threat is assessed. The third experiment manipulated the consistency of 
affect and threat-related information, to test whether a threat must be plausible to serve as 
justification. What happens when diagnostic information about threat is inconsistent with 
conditioned affect, making threat an implausible justification of prejudice? Observing such a 
scenario allows one to discover whether threat can emerge to justify prejudice even in the face of 
contradictory information. 
Threat can cause prejudice—existing theory and research makes this abundantly clear. In 
this paper, I demonstrate that the opposite causal direction can occur, that new prejudice is not 
difficult to create, and that qualitatively different threats can emerge from the same source, 
provided that the threats are plausible justifications of prejudice. 
Experiment 1 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to test the hypothesis that newly created prejudice 
increases perceived threat. In order to provide a clear test of causal direction, it is critical that the 
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content of the manipulation is unrelated to the measurement of threat. Therefore the 
manipulation included negative images and words that convey negative emotion but are not 
related to the social groups except through conditioning. Two stimulus sets were tested—one set 
emphasized feelings of disgust (e.g., rats, cockroaches, human waste) and the other set 
emphasized feelings of fear (e.g., snakes, sharks, dogs baring teeth; see Appendix for complete 
list of stimuli). While disgust and fear are undoubtedly linked to threat, the stimuli used to elicit 
these emotions were carefully selected to be unrelated to the kinds of social threats that 
comprised the dependent measures (e.g., taking away jobs, not sharing American moral values). 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 95 (56 women) undergraduates (n=35; 21 women) and nonstudent 
adults (n=60; 35 women) from the same Midwestern city; each received ten dollars payment. 
Participants were recruited through flyers posted on campus (undergraduates) and through 
Craigslist (nonstudent adults). 
Pre-testing of Target Countries 
A separate sample (N=27) rated 11 countries on affect and familiarity. A feeling 
thermometer (0=very positive, 100=very negative) assessed affect toward each country. Eritrea 
and Mauritania were selected as target countries because they received mean ratings that were 
very close to the midpoint of the scale (Eritrea M=44.81, SD=21.01, Mauritania M=45.93, 
SD=20.05); the difference was not significant, d=.05). On a rating scale (0=I’ve never heard of 
it, 1=I’ve heard of it but don’t know where it is, 2=I’ve heard of it and know where it is), the 
same two countries were rated as unfamiliar (Eritrea M=0.52, SD=0.85, Mauritania M=0.44, 
SD=0.70; the difference was not significant, d=.10). 
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Conditioning Procedure 
Pre-testing of stimuli. A separate sample (N=74) rated pictures from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbart, 2005). Participants rated one of two 
sets of 33 pictures, indicating how much the image made them feel disgusted, angry, 
discouraged, fearful, interested, or happy (1=not at all, 5=very much so) using items from Izard, 
Libero, Putnam, and Haynes (1993). A second sample (N=42) rated a set of 32 words on the 
same six emotions. 
Two stimulus sets were selected, each comprised of 20 negative images and words (10 
each), and 20 positive images and words (see Appendix). Negative stimuli were selected based 
on the criteria that the image or word had high ratings (above the midpoint of the scale) on 
negative emotions and low ratings (below the midpoint of the scale) on positive emotions (and 
the reverse for positive stimuli). Of the four negative emotions, Set 1 stimuli elicited the highest 
ratings on disgust and Set 2 stimuli elicited the highest ratings on fear. 
Procedural details. SuperLab 4.5 was used to present 430 screens of information, 
broken down into five experimental blocks. Stimulus materials were presented for 1500 ms each 
on Dell Optiplex 755 Minitowers and Dell E207WFPc monitors with a refresh rate of 85Hz. 
Participants were seated approximately 46 cm from the computer screen, positioned at eye-level. 
The conditioning phase (five blocks) lasted about 12 minutes. 
There were 40 critical trials (20 trials for each country) involving the target countries in 
which positive-affect stimuli were consistently paired with one country and negative-affect 
stimuli were consistently paired with the other country. In each block, the country names Eritrea 
and Mauritania appeared 4 times each (2 times on the same screen as a positive or negative 
image and 2 times on the same screen as a positive or negative word). Interspersed among these 
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trials were 10 trials of distracter country names, 16 trials of blank screens, and 52 trials of neutral 
images and words that were not paired with either Eritrea or Mauritania. 
Experimental design. The experiment used a 2 (Negative-Affect Country: Eritrea or 
Mauritania) x 2 (Stimulus Set: 1 or 2) x 2 (Country Rated: Eritrea, Mauritania) mixed design 
with repeated measures on Country Rated. Participants were randomly assigned to condition. 
Cover story. Participants were told the study was about attention and vigilance and given 
instructions for a surveillance task asking them to push the space bar whenever a designated 
country name appeared on the screen. This task was designed to distract participants from 
focusing on the target countries and also to ensure that participants were attending to the stimuli.
2
 
Participants searched for a different country in each block of the experiment: Moldova, Slovenia, 
Oman, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan.  On some trials, the country name appeared on-screen alone, 
and on other trials it was paired with a neutral image or word. 
Following the conditioning phase, all participants were given the same score, ostensibly 
based on the “percentage of targets correctly identified, the number of false alarms, and the 
average response time,” and told this score was slightly above average. Participants were asked 
to answer questions about immigrants from the countries included in the task, “to help us 
determine whether your performance may have been affected by the particular countries 
included in this study.” Describing the target countries as immigrant groups helped to increase 
the ecological validity of the study, but it also harmed the “purity” of the affective manipulation. 
Most people already hold stereotypes of immigrant groups. So while the threat perceptions that 
                                                 
2
 In each experiment, a funneled debriefing interview assessed participants’ awareness of the contingencies between 
target countries and affective stimuli. A small number of participants (18%) expressed some contingency awareness 
(they were not, however, aware of the hypothesis). The manipulation’s effect on feeling thermometer ratings was 
greater among contingency-aware compared to contingency-unaware participants (Expts. 1 and 2 only). This is 
consistent with a recent meta-analysis of evaluative conditioning effects which found smaller but still significant 
effect sizes for contingency-unaware relative to contingency-aware participants (Hofmann et al., 2010).  
Importantly, contingency awareness did not interact with the manipulation or dependent measures of threat; 
therefore all cases were retained in the analysis. 
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emerged may not have been entirely “new” (based on nothing but pure affect), any preexisting 
threats associated with immigrant groups should be the same for both countries; the repeated 
measures design ensures the internal validity of the study. 
The first two blocks of the conditioning procedure were repeated halfway through the 
dependent measures; participants were told this was an opportunity to improve their score. All 
participants were (falsely) told they improved their score in the second round.  
Dependent Measures 
Countries were evaluated in random order; scale items were presented in random order. 
Feeling thermometer. Following the first conditioning phase, participants rated their 
feelings toward each country whose name appeared during the task (the five distracter countries 
and Eritrea and Mauritania; 0=very positive, 100=very negative). Feeling thermometer ratings 
were used as a manipulation check. 
Negative emotions. Next participants reported how much Eritreans and Mauritanians 
made them feel disgust, fear, and anger using items from the differential emotions scale (one 
item per emotion; Izard et al., 1993; 1=not at all, 7=very much so). Negative emotions were 
measured to determine whether the manipulation differentially affected specific emotions. 
Realistic and symbolic threat scales. Following the second conditioning phase, 
participants rated each target group on perceived threat (1=strongly disagree, 7=strongly agree) 
with items adapted from Stephan et al. (1999). Four items (α=.833) measured realistic threat 
with the stem “Eritrean/Mauritanian immigrants/immigration ________” (are taking jobs away 
from American citizens, are making our neighborhoods less safe, should be eligible for the same 
health-care benefits received by American citizens [reversed], has increased the tax burden on 
Americans). Four items (α=.84) measured symbolic threat. Three items used the stem 
                                                 
3
 Scale reliabilities are for the negative-affect country collapsed across the counterbalancing factor. 
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“Eritrean/Mauritanian immigrants/immigration _________” (share the same moral values as 
most Americans [reversed], is undermining traditional American culture, is contaminating 
America’s reputation as moral and good); the fourth item was “The values and beliefs of Eritrean 
(Mauritanian) immigrants are not compatible with the values and beliefs of most Americans.” 
Results and Discussion 
Analyses are reported collapsing across the counterbalancing factor (Negative-Affect 
Country: Eritrea or Mauritania); there were no significant effects for this factor. Possible gender 
effects were examined in Experiment 1; there were no significant gender effects. The absence of 
gender effects is consistent with a recent meta-analysis showing evaluative conditioning effects 
are unaffected by gender (Hofmann et al., 2010) and with previous research on the justification 
of prejudice using this method (Crandall et al., 2011). 
Creation of Prejudice 
Feeling thermometer ratings were analyzed with a 2x2 mixed model ANOVA. The 
between-subjects factor was Stimulus Set (1 or 2). The within-subjects factor was Country Rated 
(Eritrea, Mauritania). The country associated with negative stimuli (negative-affect country) was 
evaluated more negatively compared to the country associated with positive stimuli (positive-
affect country), F(1, 91)=4.47, p=.04, d=.19 (see Table 1). These results indicate that the 
manipulation was successful in creating prejudice toward the negative-affect country. The 
interaction with stimulus set was not significant (F<1). All further analyses are collapsed across 
the stimulus set factor.
 4
 
Negative emotions were analyzed with a 3x2 ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
Emotion (disgust, anger, fear) and Country Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). The manipulation 
significantly increased ratings of disgust (F(1, 93)=8.70, p=.004, d=.32), anger (F(1, 93)=5.16, 
                                                 
4
 Stimulus set did not interact with the reported effects for any of the dependent variables. 
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p=.025, d=.22), and fear (F(1, 93)=4.13, p=.045, d=.21; see Table 1), but it did not 
differentially affect specific emotions (interaction F<1). These findings suggest that the effect of 
the manipulation was to create a diffuse negative affect associated with the negative-affect 
country rather than a specific negative emotion linked to the content of the stimuli. 
Emergent Threat Perception 
Perceived threat was analyzed with a 2x2 ANOVA, with repeated measures on Threat 
Type (realistic, symbolic) and Country Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). There was a main effect of 
conditioning such that conditioned prejudice increased perception of threat, F(1, 92)=4.65, 
p=.03, d=.19 (see Table 1). The interaction with threat type was not significant (F<1). 
To provide further evidence that the conditioning procedure was indeed manipulating 
prejudice (and not threat), a series of mediational tests was conducted. Preacher and Hayes’s 
(2008) bootstrapping macro was used to test the hypothesized mediation path in which the 
manipulation’s effect on threat is mediated by prejudice (feeling thermometer ratings). The 
indirect effect of the conditioning manipulation on realistic threat through prejudice was 
significant (b = .11, SE = .08, 95% confidence interval [.004, .32]).
5
 The manipulation increased 
prejudice, which in turn increased threat perception. By contrast, a test of the reverse mediation 
path in which the manipulation’s effect on prejudice is mediated by threat was not significant (b 
= 1.71, SE = 1.26, 95% confidence interval [-.01, 5.52]). These results suggest that the most 
immediate effect of the conditioning procedure was to increase prejudice. 
Findings from Experiment 1 support the hypothesis that prejudice causes threat 
perception. The creation of negative affective associations with unfamiliar groups caused new 
threats to emerge in the absence of information about the groups. The manipulation evoked a 
                                                 
5
 The analogous mediation test with symbolic threat as the dependent variable was not significant. Importantly, 
however, the reverse mediation path was also not significant. 
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diffuse negative affect; its effects were not specific to any one emotion or to any one stimulus 
set. Further, participants endorsed social threats for the groups that were unrelated to the content 
of the manipulation. Thus participants did not acquire specific threats (or specific emotions) from 
the manipulation itself. Instead these findings suggest a transformative psychological process—a 
process that turns negative images and words into perceived threat from the group. Without this 
psychological process there would be no particular connection between pictures of spiders, 
snakes, or a shark baring its teeth and perceiving threats to “traditional American culture” or 
“America’s reputation as moral and good.” 
Like stereotypes (Crandall et al., 2011), threat perception can emerge after the activation 
of negative affect, perhaps because it provides the perceiver an acceptable justification of 
prejudice. Multiple threats (realistic and symbolic) emerged from the same source (from a 
manipulation of affect that did not differentially affect negative emotions). The same affective 
association activated for a single social group caused qualitatively different kinds of threat 
perception to emerge. 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 1 demonstrated that threat can emerge after the activation of prejudice, and 
documented the effect using two general classes of threat (realistic and symbolic). Experiment 2 
goes one step further by examining the categories of realistic and symbolic threat with more 
precision. Experiment 2 measured two types of realistic threat (physical safety and economic 
threats) and two types of symbolic threat (threats to values and personal freedoms) as well as 
threat-relevant stereotype traits; these threats were chosen because they are likely to be plausible 
justifications for prejudice toward immigrant groups. This design provides the opportunity to 
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 Participants were 111 female
6
 undergraduates who received course credit for the 
experiment. 
Conditioning Procedure 
Procedural details. The conditioning procedure was the same as in Experiment 1, except 
it used a different set of negative-affect stimuli and the first two blocks were not repeated.
7
 
Stimulus images and words were selected from the IAPS (Lang et al., 2005) and the Affective 
Norms for English Words (Bradley & Lang, 1999) databases. SuperLab 4.5 was used to present 
stimulus materials on Lenovo ThinkCentre M Series Towers and Lenovo L1951pwD monitors 
with a refresh rate of 75Hz (Expts. 2 and 3). 
Experimental design. The experiment used a 2 (Negative-Affect Country: Eritrea or 
Mauritania) x 2 (Country Rated: Eritrea, Mauritania) mixed design with repeated measures on 
Country Rated. Participants were randomly assigned to condition. 
Cover story. The conditioning phase and the dependent measures were described as 
unrelated studies, to minimize awareness of the connection between them. The conditioning 
phase was described as a test of attention and vigilance. Next participants read about changes to 
immigration policy allegedly being considered by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
that would ostensibly increase the number of immigrants allowed into the U.S. from the 
                                                 
6
 Given the absence of gender effects in Expt. 1 and in previous research on justification of prejudice (Crandall et 
al., 2001) and evaluative conditioning (Hofmann et al., 2010), all female samples were recruited for Expts. 2 and 3. 
7
 Pre-testing determined that the second instantiation of the conditioning phase was not necessary for the creation of 
affective associations. 
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countries of Eritrea and Mauritania; the alleged purpose of the “second study” was to investigate 
how Americans feel about the groups. 
Dependent Measures 
Countries were evaluated in random order; scale items were presented in random order. 
Specific threat scales. Following the conditioning procedure, participants rated each 
country on four specific threats adapted from Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) with the stem “I feel 
that Eritreans/Mauritanians, as a group, are likely to ________ to/of people like me”( 1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree). Two items assessed economic threat (decrease economic 
opportunities available, take economic opportunities away from; r = .94). Two items assessed 
threat to personal safety (endanger the physical safety, be physically dangerous; r = .85). Two 
items assessed threat to personal freedoms (limit the personal freedoms, restrict the personal 
rights; r = .81). Two items assessed threat to values (hold values that are morally inferior to the 
values, possess values that directly oppose the values; r = .64). 
Trait ratings. Next participants rated each country on five pairs of traits using 7-point 
semantic differential scales (good-bad, safe-dangerous, nonthreatening-threatening, nonviolent-
violent, trustworthy-cannot be trusted; adapted from Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & 
Thalhammer, 1992). 
Good-bad dimension. The good-bad dimension reflects evaluative valence without 
specific threat-relevant content; it was used as a manipulation check. 
Threat dimension. The remaining four trait pairs comprised separate threat indices for 
Eritrea and Mauritania, representing endorsement of threat-relevant traits (α=.89). 
Feeling thermometer. Finally participants completed the same feeling thermometer used 
in Experiment 1; it was used as an additional manipulation check. 
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Results and Discussion 
Analyses are reported collapsing across the counterbalancing factor (Negative-Affect 
Country: Eritrea or Mauritania); there were no significant effects for this factor.  
Creation of Prejudice 
Ratings of the good-bad trait dimension were analyzed using an ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on Country Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). The analysis revealed the predicted effect of 
conditioning, F(1, 109)=5.28, p=.02, d=.24. Participants were more likely to endorse the trait 
“bad” for the negative-affect country compared to the positive-affect country (see Table 2). 
Analysis of the feeling thermometer ratings revealed a trend for more negative feelings to 
be reported for the negative-affect country compared to the positive-affect country, F(1, 
109)=3.12, p=.08, d=.23. 
Analysis of a standardized composite measure of the feeling thermometer and the good-
bad trait dimension revealed the same pattern, F(1, 109)=4.91, p=.03, d=.23. Evaluations were 
significantly more negative for the negative-affect country compared to the positive-affect 
country; these findings suggest that the manipulation was successful in creating prejudice toward 
the negative-affect country. 
Emergent Threat Perception 
 Threat-relevant traits were analyzed using an ANOVA, with repeated measures on 
Country Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). The main effect of conditioning was significant, F(1, 
109)=10.18, p=.002, d=.29.
8
 When a country was associated with negative-affect stimuli, its 
inhabitants were rated as more threatening compared to when a country was associated with 
positive-affect stimuli (see Table 2). 
                                                 
8
 The effect remains significant after controlling for the good-bad trait dimension, indicating the manipulation’s 
effects extend beyond mere affective valence (good-bad) to include threat-relevant content. 
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Ratings from the specific threat scales were analyzed with a 4x2 ANOVA, with repeated 
measures on Threat Type (economic, physical safety, personal freedoms, values) and Country 
Rated (Eritrea, Mauritania). The interaction of conditioning and threat type was not significant 
(F(3, 327)=1.69, p=.17); when a country was associated with negative affect, immigrants from 
that country were perceived to pose various kinds of threat (see Table 2). The simple effect of 
conditioning was significant for threat to values (F(1, 109)=6.79, p=.01, d=.18) and personal 
freedoms (F(1, 109)=4.13, p=.04, d=.16), marginally significant for threat to personal safety 
(F(1, 109)=3.82, p=.05, d=.14) and not significant for economic threat (F(1, 109)=0.16, p=.69, 
d=.03).  
As in Experiment 1, Preacher and Hayes’s (2008) bootstrapping macro was used to test 
the hypothesized mediation path in which the manipulation’s effect on threat is mediated by 
prejudice (feeling thermometer ratings). The indirect effect of the conditioning manipulation on 
realistic threat (a composite of economic and personal safety threats) through prejudice was 
significant (b = .20, SE = .12, 95% confidence interval [.02, .50]). The manipulation increased 
prejudice, which in turn increased threat perception. By contrast, a test of the reverse mediation 
path in which the manipulation’s effect on prejudice is mediated by threat was not significant (b 
= 2.70, SE = 1.82, 95% confidence interval [-.61, 6.63]). These results suggest that the most 
immediate effect of the conditioning procedure was to increase prejudice. 
Experiment 2 replicated the finding that prejudice causes threat perception using a new 
negative stimulus set and new measures of threat; thus it is clear that the effects are not 
dependent on the content of the manipulation itself. Experiment 2 measured emergent threat 
perception with more precision than Experiment 1, and the pattern of results was somewhat more 
complex. The effects of the conditioning manipulation were strongest for threat-relevant traits 
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and symbolic kinds of threat perception (threats to values and personal freedoms). Economic 
threat did not emerge in response to prejudice. 
These findings can be understood within the context of the JSM’s plausibility hypothesis, 
which asserts that to provide adequate justification of prejudice a threat must be accepted by 
others as an authentic threat. In the context of this experiment, symbolic threats appear to have 
been more plausible justifications than realistic threats. The only information given about the 
group was that they are immigrants, and participants may have assumed from this label alone 
that the group has different customs and values. Although immigrants are also sometimes 
perceived to pose economic threats to native-born citizens, perhaps participants felt that 
additional information would be needed to substantiate such a claim. Realistic threat did emerge 
from conditioned prejudice in Expt. 1, thus it is unclear whether the absence of an effect for 
economic threat in Expt. 2 was due to the implausibility of economic threat in this context or to 
measurement error. Future studies should directly test the plausibility of threats. 
Conditioned prejudice caused increased threat perception of various kinds. Participants 
endorsed specific threats and threat-relevant traits for the prejudiced-against group, and these 
threats originated from a common source—newly created prejudice.  One implication of these 
findings is that the same group may be perceived to pose different threats in different contexts. 
ITT and the sociofunctional approach claim that threats cause prejudice. Instead, correlations 
between specific threats and specific prejudices might be more accurately described as different 
justifications generated for different social groups. Conditioned prejudice can cause threats to 
emerge in the absence of threat-related information about the groups. Because justifications are 
applied after the activation of prejudice, they can be tailored to meet the social situation of the 
target, rather than forming the source of the prejudice itself. 
THREAT AS JUSTIFICATION   23 
Experiment 3 
Perceived threats can emerge from prejudice (Expt. 1 & 2), but does the emergent threat 
serve a justification function? In order for threat to serve as justification of prejudice it must be 
plausible (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003); therefore if emergent threat perceptions are justifications 
they should be eliminated when the plausibility of threat is undermined. Experiment 3 creates a 
situation in which threat is implausible, making it a poor justification of prejudice.  
Plausibility of a threat can be affected by the perceiver’s goals or the information 
available about the prejudiced-against group. Outside of the laboratory, people are confronted 
with a variety of affectively and cognitively based messages about groups from different sources, 
and some of these may be conflicting. It should be difficult to maintain the plausibility of a threat 
in the face of contradictory information. Threat may sometimes be unavailable as justification, 
such as when there is direct information that the group is nonthreatening.  
In Experiment 3 plausibility of threat was manipulated by providing diagnostic 
information about threat that was either consistent or inconsistent with the group’s conditioned 
affect. In the threat-plausible condition, no information about threat was provided for the 
prejudiced-against group, leaving threat available as justification of prejudice. In the threat-
implausible condition, the prejudiced-against group was described as nonthreatening, making 
threat an unlikely justification. With this design, one can discover whether the threat perception 
that emerges from conditioned prejudice serves a justification function. 
Threat perception should emerge when conditioned affect and threat-based information 
are consistent (in the threat-plausible condition); by contrast, threat perception should be 
inhibited when conditioned affect and threat-based information are inconsistent (in the threat-
implausible condition). 
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Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 119 female undergraduates who received course credit for participating. 
One participant was excluded due to a response pattern that implied lack of attention. 
Pre-testing of Target Countries 
 A separate sample (N=30) rated 32 countries on affect and familiarity. A feeling 
thermometer (0=very positive, 100=very negative) assessed affect toward each country. Guyana 
and Suriname were chosen as the target countries
9
 because they received mean ratings at the 
midpoint of the scale (Guyana M=50.00, SD=7.88, Suriname M=50.00, SD=11.74). The same 
two countries were rated as unfamiliar, using the rating scale used in the pre-test for Expt. 1 
(Guyana M=0.37, SD=0.74, Suriname M =0.48, SD=0.80; the mean difference was not 
significant, d=.14).  
Pilot Testing the Threat Plausibility Manipulation 
A separate sample (N=20) was randomly assigned to read one of two news articles 
(adapted from Stephan et al., 2005) about a plan proposed by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service in which 20,000 people from one of the target countries would be allowed to immigrate 
to the U.S.; no explicit information about threat was given for this country. The article also 
referenced the recent immigration of people from the other target country and explicitly 
described the group as nonthreatening (nonviolent, law-abiding, holding low wage jobs, not a tax 
burden).  The group described as nonthreatening was varied between participants. 
After reading the article, participants rated each group using the same threat-relevant trait 
measure used in Experiment 2. The group described as nonthreatening (M=2.71, SD=1.00) was 
                                                 
9
 New target countries were selected to ensure that the effects were not specific to any one pair of target countries. 
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rated as less threatening compared to the group for which no threat-related information was 
given (M=3.39, SD=1.39), F(1, 18)=8.61, p=.009, d=.56. 
Procedure 
 Manipulations of affect and threat. The conditioning procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 2, except that it used the target groups Guyana and Suriname. The manipulation of 
threat plausibility was presented in the same way as in the pilot test. 
 Experimental design. The experiment used a 2 (Negative-Affect Country: Guyana or 
Suriname) x 2 (Nonthreatening Country: Guyana or Suriname) x 2 (Order of Manipulations: 
affect or threat first) x 2 (Country Rated: Guyana, Suriname) mixed design with repeated 
measures on Country Rated. After collapsing across the counterbalancing factors, only two 
conceptually different conditions remained: a threat-plausible condition in which no threat-based 
information was given for the negative-affect country and the positive-affect country was 
portrayed as nonthreatening, and a threat-implausible condition in which the negative-affect 
country was portrayed as nonthreatening and no threat-based information was given for the 
positive-affect country. Thus the threat perception that may emerge in response to conditioned 
prejudice either remained plausible (in the threat-plausible condition) or was contested (in the 
threat-implausible condition). 
 Cover story. The affect and threat manipulations were described as separate studies and 
the order was varied between subjects. Participants were told the purpose of the studies was to 
test attention and vigilance (affect manipulation) and to assess the fairness and objectivity of 
media reports on immigration issues (threat manipulation). Participants completed five items 
about the article in order to uphold the cover story (e.g., “In your opinion, was the article you 
read objective in its coverage of the issue?”) 
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Dependent Measures 
The dependent measures were administered after the affect and threat manipulations. 
Scale order was varied between subjects so that order of the manipulations and order of the 
dependent measures (feeling thermometer or traits first) was counterbalanced. 
Feeling thermometer and trait ratings. Participants rated the target groups in random 
order using the feeling thermometer and threat-relevant trait measures (α =.86) used in 
Experiment 2 and a new measure of negative stereotype traits that are not related to threat. 
Negative stereotypes. Participants rated each group on 10 pairs of negative stereotype 
trait adjectives using 7-point semantic differential scales (friendly-unfriendly, sincere-insincere, 
warm-cold, honest-dishonest, generous-selfish, good-bad, humble-arrogant, considerate-
inconsiderate, patient-impatient, intelligent-unintelligent; α =.91). Separate indices were 
computed for Guyana and Suriname, with higher numbers representing greater endorsement of 
negative stereotypes. 
Results and Discussion 
 Preliminary analyses included the order of manipulations as a between-subjects factor. 
There were no significant effects; therefore order was excluded from all analyses. 
Each dependent measure was analyzed with a 2x2x2 mixed model ANOVA. The 
between-subjects factors were Negative-Affect Country (Guyana or Suriname) and 
Nonthreatening Country (Guyana or Suriname). The within-subjects factor was Country Rated 
(Guyana, Suriname). The critical test of the plausibility hypothesis is what happens when threat 
and affect are inconsistent—how is a group rated when it’s associated with negative affect and 
described as nonthreatening? Planned comparisons were used to test this hypothesis by 
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comparing ratings of the negative-affect country in the threat-plausible and threat-implausible 
conditions. 
Threat Perception 
  Analysis of threat-relevant trait ratings determined there was a significant interaction of 
the affect and threat manipulations, F(1, 114)=24.31, p<.0005, d=.92. Follow-up tests revealed a 
different pattern of results in the threat-plausible and threat-implausible conditions (Fig. 1a), 
indicating that consistency of affect and threat-based information is necessary for threat to 
emerge as justification of prejudice. Conditioned prejudice significantly increased endorsement 
of threat-relevant traits in the threat-plausible condition, F(1, 58)=14.26, p<.0005, d=.56, and 
significantly decreased endorsement of threat-relevant traits in the threat-implausible condition, 
F(1, 56)=10.40, p=.002, d=.41.  
The negative-affect country was rated as more threatening than the positive-affect 
country when no threat-related information was available for that country; by contrast, the 
negative-affect country was rated as less threatening than the positive-affect country when it was 
explicitly described as nonthreatening (see Table 3). The planned comparison showed that the 
threat plausibility manipulation significantly decreased threat perception for the negative-affect 
country, t(116)=2.76, p=.01. As predicted, threat perception emerged as justification of prejudice 
but only when there was no threat-based information available for that group. Threat perception 
was particularly unlikely when the prejudiced-against group was described as nonthreatening. 
Negative Stereotypes 
Analysis of negative stereotype trait ratings determined there was a significant interaction 
of the affect and threat manipulations, F(1, 114)=15.71, p<.0005, d=.73. Follow-up tests 
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revealed a different pattern of results in the threat-plausible and threat-implausible conditions 
(Fig. 1b). 
In the threat-plausible condition, conditioned prejudice significantly increased 
endorsement of negative stereotype traits, F(1, 58)=16.92, p<.0005, d=.46. Participants endorsed 
negative stereotypes more for the negative-affect country than for the positive-affect country 
when no threat-related information was available for that country. These results are consistent 
with previous research showing that stereotypes can emerge as justifications for prejudice 
(Crandall et al., 2011). When affect and threat information were consistent with each other, 
negative stereotypes—like threat—emerged as a result of conditioned prejudice. 
In the threat-implausible condition, by contrast, participants’ endorsement of negative 
stereotypes was not significantly affected by the manipulation of affect, F(1, 56)=2.55, p =.12, 
d=.19.  Importantly, however, the planned comparison showed that the simple effect of the threat 
plausibility manipulation was not significant for the negative-affect country, t(116)=1.11, p=.27. 
Negative stereotype endorsement was just as high for the negative-affect country when it was 
described as nonthreatening as when no threat-related information was available for that country 
(see Table 3). Despite the group’s positive portrayal, negative stereotype endorsement for the 
prejudiced-against country was unaffected. 
Feeling Thermometer 
 Analysis of feeling thermometer ratings determined the interaction of the affect and threat 
manipulations was significant, F(1, 114)=9.52, p=.003, d=.57. Follow-up tests revealed a similar 
pattern as for negative stereotypes. Conditioned prejudice significantly decreased liking in the 
threat-plausible condition, F(1, 58)=14.24, p<.0005, d=.34, but had no effect in the threat-
implausible condition, F(1, 56)=1.03, p=.31, d=.13. Importantly, the planned comparison 
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showed that the simple effect of the threat plausibility manipulation was not significant for the 
negative-affect country, t(116)=0.90, p=.37. The negative-affect country was evaluated just as 
negatively when it was described as nonthreatening as when no threat-related information was 
available (see Table 3). 
Findings from Experiment 3 support the hypothesis that threat must be plausible to 
emerge as justification of prejudice. When no information about threat was available for the 
group associated with negative affect, participants perceived that the group was dangerous, 
violent, untrustworthy, and threatening; threat perception remained plausible as a justification. 
When the plausibility of a justification was undermined with information about threat that was 
inconsistent with conditioned prejudice, participants did not develop the perception of threat. 
They did, however, report negative evaluations of the group in areas not directly related to threat. 
The within-subjects comparisons of the conditioning procedure’s effects on negative 
stereotype endorsement and liking were not statistically significant in the threat-implausible 
condition, probably because group evaluations were pushed in one direction by conditioned 
affect and pulled in the opposite direction by information about threat. One could reasonably 
expect that the relatively subtle effect of the conditioning manipulation would be attenuated 
somewhat by an explicitly positive portrayal of the negative-affect country. Nevertheless, 
participants endorsed negative stereotypes and reported having negative feelings about the 
prejudiced-against group just as much when it was described as nonthreatening as when no 
information about threat was available for that group. Even when affect and threat information 
were conflicting, negative stereotype endorsement and affective evaluations revealed a tempered, 
yet still present effect of conditioned prejudice. 
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Both prejudice and information about threat were experimentally introduced in 
Experiment 3, providing the opportunity to simultaneously test whether prejudice causes threat 
and whether threat causes prejudice. If threat is primarily a source of prejudice, then evaluations 
should have been uniformly more positive when a country was described as nonthreatening 
compared to when no information about threat was available. This was true only for threat-
relevant traits. Negative stereotypes and liking were unaffected by the threat plausibility 
manipulation. Conditioned prejudice caused perception of threat when threat remained plausible 
as justification, but this effect was eliminated when threat was no longer plausible. This suggests 
that in this experiment, threat perception and other kinds of evaluative judgments functioned as 
justifications rather than causes of prejudice. When affective and cognitive messages were in 
conflict, group evaluations were primarily shaped by conditioned affect except in the one limited 
domain for which directly diagnostic information was available. 
General Discussion 
 Across three experiments I created new prejudices—negative affective associations with 
unfamiliar social groups—and found that perceived threat emerged as a result. Specific threats 
emerged to justify conditioned prejudice, but only when threat perception remained plausible. 
When threat-based information about the group was inconsistent with conditioned affect making 
threat an implausible justification of prejudice, participants did not develop the perception of 
threat. 
 All three experiments used affective conditioning methods, but the exact procedures 
differed somewhat across experiments. This ensured that the effects were not contingent on the 
particular stimulus set used to create the affective association, the measurement of threat, or the 
target countries used. Despite the procedural differences, there was a consistent pattern of 
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results: When a country was associated with negative affect (and no threat-related information 
was available to contest the threat perception), its inhabitants were perceived to be more 
threatening. These findings support the hypothesis that prejudice can cause threat. The 
conditioning effect was subtle (mean d=.24) but statistically reliable, and comparable in size to 
the effects reported by Olson and Fazio (2001) and Crandall et al. (2011) using similar methods. 
Threat as Justification of Prejudice 
All three experiments found that prejudice can cause threat perception and helped to 
clarify some of the criteria that must be met in order for threat to emerge as a consequence of 
prejudice. A compelling explanation for these findings is offered by the JSM (Crandall & 
Eshleman, 2003)—threat provides perceivers a plausible justification of prejudice. Social norms 
dictate that prejudice is unacceptable; the psychological discomfort aroused by the activation of 
prejudice can be assuaged by constructing an acceptable justification.  The JSM contends that 
intergroup threat is a possible justification, but the idea had not previously been experimentally 
tested. Previous research has shown that stereotypes can fulfill this role (Crandall et al., 2011; 
McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002). 
Might the results be explained by processes other than justification? A potential 
explanation for the findings is the broader set of psychological theories that emphasize the need 
for cognitive consistency (e.g., Festinger, 1957; Heider, 1958).  Just as attitudes can shift to 
explain past behavior, threat perception can be socially constructed as a means of understanding 
the social world. But cognitive consistency motives cannot explain why in Experiment 2 some 
kinds of threat were more likely to emerge than others. To account for these results, a theory 
must be able to explain why perceivers are sensitive to the plausibility of the threats. The JSM 
suggests that beyond general consistency motives, perceivers tailor justifications to meet the 
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social situation of the target because of the desire to maintain an unprejudiced self-image. The 
specificity of emergent threat perceptions observed in the current experiments fits well with this 
account. 
Findings from Experiment 3 suggest that for threat to be a plausible justification, 
affective and threat-based messages about the group must be consistent. Conditioned prejudice 
increased endorsement of threat-relevant traits, but only when no threat information was 
available for the group. When threat perception was contested by affect-inconsistent information 
about threat, threat could no longer satisfy the requirement of plausibility. 
Explicit information that a group is nonthreatening suppressed endorsement of threat-
relevant traits, but had little effect on negative stereotypes that were not related to threat. Groups 
associated with negative affect were negatively stereotyped and disliked—even when the group 
was believed to be nonthreatening. This suggests that contesting specific beliefs about a group is 
unlikely to be effective in reducing prejudice. It is simply too easy for perceivers to find an 
alternate justification that allows them to maintain their prejudice. Instead, targeting feelings by 
associating a group with positive affect may be more successful. 
Threat: Cause or Consequence of Prejudice? 
ITT (Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Stephan & Renfro, 2002) and the sociofunctional 
approach to prejudice (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Neuberg & Cottrell, 2002) hypothesize that 
threat causes prejudice. While there is evidence to support this hypothesis, the current 
experiments provide new evidence that prejudice can cause threat. Therefore, an important 
contribution of the current research is in recognizing that any correlational evidence cited in 
support of these theories (e.g., Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Cottrell et al., 2010; Stephan et al., 
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1999) is consistent with both directional paths—threat can cause prejudice and prejudice can 
cause threat—and thus does not uniquely support ITT or the sociofunctional approach.  
Clearly, causal pathways among the affective and cognitive processes involved in 
prejudice may work in both directions. Rather than searching for simple cause and effect 
relationships among variables, a bidirectional view considers the affective and cognitive 
processes involved in prejudice as part of a complex, interdependent system (Stephan & 
Stephan, 1993). Threat can be both a cause and a consequence of prejudice. Recognizing both 
directional paths can advance theory by helping to clarify when prejudice forms in relation to 
threat. 
In this research prejudice is operationalized as negative affect associated with a social 
group. However there are several theories of prejudice that make different predictions depending 
on the specific emotion experienced in the intergroup context (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske 
et al., 2002; Mackie et al., 2000). Whether specific intergroup emotions can cause qualitatively 
different threat perceptions to emerge remains an open empirical question. 
Conclusions 
Prejudice can cause threat and threat can cause prejudice, yet people’s evaluations of 
other groups are greatly influenced by the feelings experienced in intergroup contexts. If 
negative feelings for a group already exist, beliefs that the group is threatening are likely to 
follow. Threats are not necessarily inherent to the characteristics of the group; threat perception 
can be used as a way to explain the experience of prejudice, rather than forming the source of the 
prejudice itself.  
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition, Experiment 1 
 Negative Affect Positive Affect  
 M SD M SD d 
Creation of Prejudice      
Feeling Thermometer 47.41 19.00 43.95 18.31 *.19* 
Disgust 1.40 0.90 1.17 0.44 **.32** 
Anger 1.46 0.93 1.28 0.71 *.22* 
Fear 1.44 0.86 1.28 0.65 *.21* 
Emergent Threats      
Symbolic Threat 3.01 1.23 2.75 1.32 *.21* 
Realistic Threat 2.98 1.42 2.75 1.33 *.17* 
 
*p<.05, **p<.01.
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition, Experiment 2  
 Negative Affect Positive Affect  
 M SD M SD d 
Creation of Prejudice      
“Bad” Trait Endorsement 3.44 1.02 3.17 1.19 *.24* 
Feeling Thermometer 39.35 17.64 36.48 16.71 .23 
Negativity Index 0.10 0.92 -0.10 0.83 *.23* 
Emergent Threats      
“Threat” Stereotype Traits 3.65 1.14 3.34 0.98 **.29** 
Values 2.56 1.33 2.33 1.16 *.18* 
Personal Freedoms 2.39 1.46 2.17 1.23 *.16* 
Personal Safety 2.52 1.56 2.31 1.35 .14 
Economic 2.75 1.63 2.71 1.42 .03 
 
Note. Negativity index is the standardized composite measure of feeling thermometer ratings and 
“bad” stereotype trait endorsement. 
*p<.05, **p<.01.  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics by Condition, Experiment 3 
 Affect Manipulation  
 Negative Affect Positive Affect  
 M SD M SD d 
 Threat Manipulation—Threat-Plausible   
 No Information Nonthreatening  
Threat Perception 3.51 1.18 2.85 1.20 ***.56*** 
Negative Stereotypes 3.39 0.79 3.01 0.86 ***.46*** 
Feeling Thermometer 34.15 18.88 28.03 17.01 ***.34*** 
 Threat Manipulation—Threat-Implausible   
 Nonthreatening No Information  
Threat Perception 2.97 0.98 3.39 1.10 **.41** 
Negative Stereotypes 3.23 0.81 3.39 0.84 .19 
Feeling Thermometer 31.23 18.09 33.44 15.93 .13 
 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figures 1a and 1b. Threat emerges as justification of conditioned prejudice when perceived 
threat is plausible but not when perceived threat is implausible (Fig. 1a).  Negative stereotype 
endorsement for the negative-affect country is unaffected by the threat plausibility manipulation 
(Fig. 1b). 
 
 
 
